制造商与两个具有竞争性的零售商的两阶段博弈模型

针对一个制造商和两个具有竞争性的零售商组成的供应链两阶段博弈模型.首先考虑下游零售商之间的Stackelberg博弈,然后又以整体最优讨论制造商为主导的Stackelberg博弈的两阶段博弈模型.数字实验结果表明:该策略不仅能提高制造商的利润,而且能改善销售商的利润,特别是对于供应链成员之间具有较高的竞争强度.     

状态转移游戏问题的建模及求解

将若干游戏问题推广为状态转移游戏问题,建立了相应的数学模型,给出了解决方案,深化了现行的相关结果.     

求2~3-三矩阵对策Nash平衡解的方法

提出了求2~3-三矩阵对策Nash平衡解的方法.     

基于博弈论的融资租赁保证金确定方法研究

针对融资租赁中租金偿还违约风险的防范问题,研究了如何合理设置租赁保证金来防范违约风险.运用博弈理论建立了租金偿还的动态博弈模型,采用逆向归纳法求解该博弈模型并推导出了预防性保证金确定方法及其适用条件,通过边界条件的改变继而推导出了补偿性保证金确定方法及其适用条件.算例分析表明,运用两种方法来计算租赁保证金时,只需已知租赁项目各期租金和租赁资产的价值而无需知道租赁项目的各期收益,仅以出租人预期租赁项目在各期的收益与租金之间的大小作为判据来选择保证金确定方法.两种保证金确定方法具有较高的实用性和可操作性,是出租人合理地确定租赁保证金的有效方法.     

C2C模式下卖家信誉建立与提升策略研究

当前信誉已成为电子商务发展中不可回避的问题.C2C模式下,信誉是交易进行的基础,它直接关系着交易的安全有效.从卖家收益的视角出发,运用博弈理论分析了C2C模式下卖家信誉的演化过程,提出了惩罚和信任两种策略的适用条件.结果表明对于新进入的卖家,发表承诺和买方的惩罚能够促使其建立信誉,而对于已具有一定信誉值的卖家而言,买家的充分的信任和积极评价将是其维持和提升信誉的动力来源.     

On the Sociobiology of Hawks and Doves. A phase diagram for integration and segregation

Competing groups in a population will be integrated or segregated depending on their contest strategies. In this work a population of a fixed proportion of hawks and doves is supposed to be able to employ two different contest strategies, one more competitive than the other one. Energies are derived for populations employing these strategies and these energies depend on the availability of the resource for which hawks and doves compete. The energy for the less competitive strategy is lower than the other one when the resource is abundant. In that case hawks and doves can be in cohabitation in all proportions. If, however, the resource is scarce, the energy of the more competitive strategy is lower than the other one. In that case complete segregation of hawks and doves into colonies will result. The situation is akin to the phase pressure diagram of a binary solution with eutectic point, miscibility gap in the liquid phase and complete miscibility in the vapour phase. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Evolutionary structural optimisation using an additive algorithm

The evolutionary structural optimisation (ESO) method has been under continuous development since 1992. Traditionally, the method was conceived from the engineering perspective that the topology and shape of structures were naturally conservative for safety reasons and therefore contained an excess of material. To move from the conservative design to a more optimum design would therefore involve the removal of material. Thus the ESO method started from a design space much bigger than the optimum and the final topology or shape emerged by a process of removal of unwanted/inefficient/lowly stresses material. The original algorithms allowed for two forms of evolution. One was there the understressed material could be removed from anywhere in the allowable design space, and with compensation for checker-boarding this produces an optimum topology under the prescribed environments. The second form only allows removal from the surface or parts of the surface (called nibbling in the ESO lexicon); this produces a Min–Max situation where the maximum surface stress is reduced to a minimum. It has been demonstrated that the ESO process produces a surface that is an iso-stress contour thus satisfying the Min–Max optimality criterion. The present paper addresses the opposite evolutionary process whereby the structure evolves from a base which is the minimum structural form required to carry the load regardless of the magnitude of the stress levels. Material is added in the proximity of high stress to ameliorate its effect and hence the final structural form emerges. Only singly connected regions are formed in the present analysis and thus the additive ESO process is the opposite of the nibbling SO, mentioned above, that produces optimum surface shapes. The paper presents a brief background to the current state of structural optimisation research. This is followed by a discussion of the strategies for the additive ESO (AESO) algorithm and two examples are presented.     

团队生产中的博弈模型与道德风险研究

首先根据团队生产在产出函数的特点,建立了由二人组成的团队生产模型;接着,在分析了团队生产的博弈过程后,求得团队成员努力投入的N ash均衡;最后,着重研究了两种证实团队生产中存在道德风险的方法.     

Monotonicity in the stock competition game with consumer search

Anupindi and Bassok investigate the impact of centralizing the stocks in a one-manufacturer-two-retailer supply chain with consumer search. They observed through numerical studies that in the decentralized scenario, the retailers’ order quantities are monotonic in the consumer search probability. This paper provides an analytical justification of this monotonicity.     

Monotonicity properties of wholesale price contracts

This paper contributes to the supply chain contracts literature in economics and operations by performing qualitative sensitivity analysis of a wholesale price contract in a two-echelon supply chain setting. Order-theory tools are used to derive sufficient conditions for monotonicity of contract parameters.The upstream supplier is modeled as a Stackelberg leader. The supplier is assumed to have complete information about the costs and revenue function of the downstream retailer. It is shown that an equilibrium wholesale price weakly increases with an increase in the supplier production cost rate, but it may increase or decrease with an increase in the retailer cost rate. As either the supplier production cost or the retailer cost increases, the supplier profit decreases weakly. Additional sensitivity analysis is performed assuming certain properties of the retailer revenue function.Several well-known results in the supply chain contracting literature can be considered as special cases of the more general theorems developed here. In particular, this paper reexamines the analysis of a newsvendor supply chain problem by Lariviere and Porteus [Lariviere, M.A., Porteus, E.L., 2001. Selling to the newsvendor: An analysis of price-only contracts. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3, 293–305]. This paper generalizes and extends their work, by establishing properties of the newsvendor demand distribution that guarantee monotonicity of the contract parameters, without requiring a unique contract solution.